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AbStRACt
the principle of assistance says that the global rich should help the global poor 
because they are able to do so, and at little cost. the principle of contribution says 
that the rich should help the poor because the rich are partly to blame for the plight of 
the poor. this paper explores the relationship between the two principles and offers 
support for one version of the principle of assistance. the principle of assistance is 
most plausible, the paper argues, when formulated so as to identify obligations that 
arise from the needs of particular identifiable members of the global poor, not from 
impersonal rules or values. Under that formulation, the principle can explain why 
knowledge of the circumstances faced by individual members of the global poor can 
have such a marked effect upon the willingness of the global rich to provide help, and 
can offer a better grounded motivational basis for helping the global poor. these are 
real advantages, the paper argues, and ones that cannot be matched by stories that 
focus upon the ways in which the global rich contribute to global poverty.
the GlobAl RiCh And the GlobAl PooR
 the world’s wealthier people are much, much richer than the world’s poorer 
people. the size of the inequality is difficult to comprehend, but here are some cred-
ible estimates: 85% of the world’s wealth is held by 10% of its population, the poorest 
50% of the world’s population holds 1% of its wealth, and the richest 20% of the 
world’s population consumes 77% of its material goods (Shah 2011). Anyone reading 
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this paper is probably, in global terms, rich. “We” are the global rich and “they” are 
the global poor.
 that the global poor are much poorer than us does not mean that they are 
poor absolutely, and it does not mean that they live bad lives. Many of the global poor, 
surely, live happier and more fulfilled lives than many of us. but many of the global 
poor are absolutely poor and do suffer profoundly as a result. Again, no brief descrip-
tion can be adequate, but here, again, are some credible estimates: 22,000 people die 
every day due to poverty-related causes, 1.4 billion people live on less than US$1.25 
per day, 1.8 million children die each year due to diarrhea, and 400 million children 
lack access to safe water (Shah 2011). Poverty brings not only suffering but also vul-
nerability. Many of the global poor are unable to exercise meaningful control over the 
directions of their lives, and many are subject to economic and personal exploitation 
(o’neill 2007).
 the misfortune of the global poor is not unrelated to the fortune of the global 
rich, and it is plausible—though not uncontroversial—to say that the global rich are 
partly responsible for the plight of the global poor. entrenched global poverty can be 
partly attributed, arguably, to an ongoing history of colonial, military, and financial 
interventions of rich countries into poor countries. We participate with the global 
poor in an integrated global economy whose structures and guiding institutions, ar-
guably, are largely mandated by rich countries and ensure that global poverty is per-
petuated (Pogge 2007, pp. 634-638; Singer 2009, pp. 30-35).
 it is also plausible—though not, again, uncontroversial—to say that it is within 
our power to improve the lives of the global poor, and to do so at relatively small cost 
to ourselves. Compared with the amount of money spent by a person like you and me 
every day on luxuries, it does not cost very much to provide a poor person in a poor 
country with essential medicines, nutrition, and shelter, and there exist prominent 
charities that do a good job of transferring money from the global rich to the global 
poor (Singer 1972, p. 232; Singer 2009, pp. 15-19 and ch. 6). We may also help the global 
poor indirectly by donating money to political campaigns, pressuring our govern-
ments and corporations, and changing our habits as consumers, to give just a few 
examples (Singer 1972, p. 240; Singer 2009, ch. 7).
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helPinG the GlobAl PooR: ReASonS veRSUS MotiveS
 Supposing that the claims just mentioned are all correct—we are much richer 
than the global poor, many of them are badly off in absolute terms, their poverty is 
partly our fault, and we are in a position to help them—it is very plausible to think that 
we have a moral reason to help the global poor: that morally, all else equal, we should 
do something to help. but what is the nature of that moral reason, exactly? here are 
two possible stories (barry and overland 2012, pp. 869-870; barry and overland 2013).
 on one story, we should help the global poor because they are in need and we 
can help them, and at a relatively insignificant cost to ourselves. our moral reason to 
help the global poor, runs the story, arises just from the facts about their plight and 
our ability to help alleviate it. this story rests upon a moral principle that we can call 
“the principle of assistance.” the principle of assistance says that we should help the 
global poor because we can, and at little sacrifice (Singer 1972; Cullity 2004; Singer 
2009).
 on another story, it is a crucial additional fact that we bear blame for the 
plight of the global poor. our moral reason to help the global poor, runs this second 
story, is that we owe them restitution for the harms that we—the global rich—have 
done them. the principle that lies behind this story can be called “the principle of 
contribution.” the principle of contribution says that we should help the global poor 
because we have contributed to their poverty (Pogge 2002, pp. 11-20; Pogge 2007, pp. 
633-634; Pogge 2010, pp. 20-15; Risse 2012, pp. 113-118).
 each story is plausible on the surface, and the principle of assistance and the 
principle of contribution are not incompatible. the two principles, as i have expressed 
them, are concerned only with moral reasons to relieve global poverty, but they each 
reflect something compelling about moral reasons to help others more generally. if 
you see a child who is in distress after falling off her bike, and if you can easily give 
her help, then you should help her—and you have extra reason to help her if it was 
you who caused her fall.
Many of us find it very natural, then, to think that we have strong moral reason, 
of one kind or another, to help poor people in other parts of the world. but those 
of us who believe that we have such a reason are unlikely to believe that we do a 
very good job of acting on it. our governments do not do much, really, to relieve 
global poverty; the world’s richest countries give around 0.29% of their gross national 
income in aid to impoverished countries (organisation for economic Co-operation 
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and development, 2015). As individuals, many of us do nothing, and many of us do 
hardly anything. there are few who would accept the principle of assistance or the 
principle of contribution while also believing that the obligations of the global rich 
to the global poor are being fully discharged.
it is not just that we do not do enough to help the global poor. it is also that our 
patterns of helping the global poor do not appear to respond reliably to our reasons 
to help them. the global poor are always there and always in need of help, but we are 
more likely to be generous in response to identifiable, delimited individuals or events 
than in response to ongoing global poverty. We are more likely to give to a relief effort 
to help victims of a war, an earthquake, or a tsunami than to give to efforts to help 
people whose poverty is caused by long-term systemic factors. We are more likely to 
give if we take ourselves to be sponsoring a particular impoverished child, rather than 
to be one contributor to an effort to help many impoverished people. We are moved 
more by images and stories of particular poor people than by information about the 
overall problem of global poverty (Singer 2009, pp. 48-56). in all of these respects, our 
tendencies to help the global poor seem insufficiently responsive to the truly morally 
weighty features of the phenomenon of global poverty: its sheer size and its entrench-
ment. When it comes to helping the global poor, we may say, our reasons are not 
matched by our motives.
thiS PAPeR
that is my description of the basic facts, including the basic moral facts, of the 
relationship between the global rich and the global poor. As mentioned, my descrip-
tion is open to dispute at several points, but still, it is plausible and widely believed 
and it sets the scene for this paper. My goal in this paper is to defend a version of the 
principle of assistance: one that i call the “individuals-based” principle of assistance, 
and that grounds our moral reasons for helping the global poor in considerations of 
particular individual members of the global poor. the principle of contribution, for 
all i say, may also yield moral reasons to help relieve global poverty, and other ver-
sions of the principle of assistance may do so too; the various stories are not, after all, 
incompatible. but i want to show that only the individuals-based principle of assis-
tance can explain certain crucial facts about our motives to help the global poor, and 
that this is a reason to think the principle correct. if i am right, then the individuals-
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based principle of assistance must be a big part of the truth about our moral reasons 
to help relieve global poverty.
My case for the individuals-based principle of assistance draws conclusions 
about reasons to help the global poor based on some claims about our motives for 
helping the global poor. it is one thing to talk about our reasons and another to talk 
about our motives. but, i want to show, these topics are linked. different stories about 
our reasons yield different claims about what knowledge we have of our reasons, and 
our motives are likely to be different depending upon how much we know about our 
reasons. More specifically, i shall try to show that the individuals-based principle of 
assistance predicts that we in our present situation lack full knowledge of our moral 
reasons to help the global poor, and that it follows that our motives for helping the 
global poor are likely to be unreliable and sporadic, in much the ways we in fact find 
them to be. that is a reason for thinking that we take our reasons to be those posited 
by the individuals-based principle of assistance, and that, i shall go on to argue, is a 
reason for thinking that that principle is correct.
i should be clear about how i am using some terms. A “reason” to act, as i use 
the term, is a consideration that counts in favor of an action. by “counts in favor” i 
mean “really counts in favor”; on my way of talking, a “bad reason” is no reason at 
all. A “moral reason” is a moral consideration that counts in favor of a certain action. 
When i offer something as a moral reason for you to do something, i mean to explain 
why you morally should do it, all other things equal. that playing computer games 
all afternoon would be fun, for example, might be a reason to play computer games 
all afternoon, without being a moral reason.
A “motive” for action, as i use the term, is whatever moves a person towards 
performing an action. (note that you might have a motive to perform an act but not 
in fact perform the act; you might try to perform the act and fail, or your motive 
might be outweighed by a different motive.) Sometimes, what moves you to perform 
an action might be a consideration that counts in favor of the action, and is hence 
also a reason to act: you might be motivated to brush your teeth by the thought that 
brushing your teeth helps avoid tooth decay, and the fact that brushing your teeth 
helps avoid tooth decay may be a consideration that in fact favors your brushing your 
teeth. Sometimes, your motive may be a consideration that does not in fact count as 
a reason: you might be moved to brush your teeth by the thought that brushing your 
teeth helps save the rainforests. And sometimes, your motive may involve no consid-
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eration at all: you might be moved to brush your teeth by a bare urge or impulse or 
habit.
the paper’s argument rests upon distinctions between different versions of 
the principle of assistance and the principle of contribution, and a conviction that 
making the distinctions is worthwhile. So i will start by saying how the principle of 
assistance and principle of contribution might be more precisely expressed, and why 
the choice between them, in their various forms, matters.
ASSiStAnCe And ContRibUtion
 the principle of assistance says that we should help the global poor because 
they need our help and we can provide it, and at little sacrifice to ourselves. the prin-
ciple of contribution says that we should help the global poor because we have con-
tributed to their poverty. there are various strategies through which either principle 
could be connected with a wider claim about obligations to help others. it is an open 
question on the principle of assistance, for example, whether we have obligations to 
help the global poor even when doing so does require significant sacrifice, and it is an 
open question whether we have obligations to help anyone—poor or not—whom we 
could help with little sacrifice. Similarly, an advocate of the principle of contribution 
may say that we are obliged to give restitution for all harm to which we contribute, or 
only for harm to which we wrongly contribute, or whatever else.
 even as stated, though, the two principles posit reasons that apply in dif-
ferent cases and that sometimes pull in different directions. there may be people 
who live in severe poverty and whom we are able to help, but whose poverty cannot 
be blamed on the global rich; in such cases, the principle of assistance but not the 
principle of contribution posits reasons to help. there may be impoverished people 
whose poverty is not severe, by world standards, and whom we could only help with 
difficulty, but whose poverty is clearly our fault; in a case like this, the principle of 
contribution would appear to offer a reason to help, but the principle of assistance 
may not.
there may also be cases in which the two principles yield different claims about 
whom it is most important to help, or about whom we should help first. depending 
upon exactly how they are expressed, the principle of assistance is likely to recom-
mend that we be guided by the goal of giving as much help as we can to those who 
need it most, while the principle of contribution is likely to recommend that we be 
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guided by the goal of giving compensation to those to whom we have caused the great-
est harm. these goals can conflict. Sometimes we may have to choose, for example, 
whether to help someone who is in greater poverty or someone for whose poverty we 
carry greater blame.
it matters for practical purposes whether we accept one of the principles and 
dismiss the other, and if we accept that there is truth in both principles, then it matters 
how we weigh them against each other. it also matters, in a number of respects, how 
exactly the two principles are formulated. let me briefly mention two questions of 
formulation faced by the principles, before discussing at some length a third.
First, the principles need to say what counts as helping the global poor. the 
principle of assistance could tell us to make the global poor happier, for example, 
or to satisfy their basic material needs, or to make them less exploited, or to ensure 
that they have greater opportunities. the principle of contribution could tell us to 
compensate the poor with money, for example, or with whatever would best address 
their lack of happiness, or it could say that the global poor are now our responsibility 
in some broader sense.
Second, the principles need to say, at various points, whether they are speaking 
of groups or of individuals. to see how this makes a difference, imagine the following 
case.
Suppose that the philosophers at a university have an obligation to provide 
morning tea for the whole faculty. this will be an obligation held by the philosophers 
as a group. it does not matter which particular philosophers provide the morning tea, 
and it does not matter if some philosophers take no part in its provision. So long as 
the morning tea is provided by someone acting on behalf of the philosophers, the 
obligation is discharged. our obligation to help the global poor could, like this one, 
be a group obligation. it could require that something be done on the part of the 
global rich, considered as a group, whether any particular member of the global rich 
contributes or not.
 the philosophers at the university may also have an obligation to attend a staff 
meeting. this obligation will not be held by the philosophers considered as group, 
but will instead fall on each philosopher considered separately: each philosopher is 
obliged to attend the meeting. there are then really several obligations to attend the 
meeting—one for each philosopher—and those obligations cannot be discharged 
just through some philosophers acting in the name of all the philosophers. if our 
obligation to help the global poor is like the philosophers’ obligation to attend a staff 
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meeting, then it is an obligation that falls separately upon each of us. to speak of the 
obligation of the global rich would then be to speak, really, of many obligations—one 
for each member of the global rich—and it would not be possible for all our obliga-
tions to the global poor to be discharged just through the acts of some rich people 
acting on behalf of all of us.
 Just as an obligation can fall collectively upon a group or separately upon each 
member of a group, an obligation can be held towards a group or separately towards 
each member of a group. the obligation of the global rich could be an obligation to 
improve the lot of the global poor, considered as a class. or it could be an obligation 
held towards each person within that class, so that there are really many obligations 
on the part of the global rich, one towards each member of the global poor.
 the same goes for talk about the ability of the global rich to help the global 
poor. Are we talking about what could be done by the global rich, considered as a 
class, or about what could be done by the various individual rich people? Are we 
talking about an ability to help the global poor, construed as a group, or about various 
abilities to help various particular members of the global poor?
And, the same goes for talk about the contribution made by the global rich to 
the plight of the global poor. Are we talking about a contribution to the existence of a 
class of poor people, or are we talking about a contribution to the poverty of particu-
lar poor individuals? Are we talking about the contribution made by the global rich, 
considered collectively, or about the individual contributions of various individual 
rich people?
depending upon how the principles answer these questions, they will tell differ-
ent stories about where the obligations to help reduce global poverty fall, where they 
come from, and what it would take for them to be met. how the principles answer 
these questions also makes a difference to how plausible the principles are, and to 
how they can be compared and contrasted with each other—and also, i will say later, 
to how the reasons posited in the principles might be expressed in our motives.
UtilitARiAniSM And the PRinCiPle oF ASSiStAnCe
 i now want to spend some time discussing a third question faced by the prin-
ciples. the question is about what kind of consideration grounds our moral reason 
to help the global poor, and whether that consideration is concerned with certain 
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individual people, or instead with certain values. i will start by explaining how the 
question arises for a utilitarian approach to the principle of assistance.
 Utilitarianism, as i shall speak of it, says that the right act to perform under 
any circumstances is the one that produces the greatest possible balance of happi-
ness over unhappiness. (this is one form of utilitarianism. there are others, but for 
the sake of illustration this one will do.) Utilitarianism, in conjunction with the facts 
about global poverty, leads quickly to a version of the principle of assistance. there 
are acts we can perform that will involve relatively small sacrifices in happiness for us 
while bringing about relatively large increases in happiness for the global poor, so by 
helping the global poor we can increase the overall balance of happiness over unhap-
piness. but consider two different stories about how you might come to utilitarianism 
in the first place.
 A first story about how to get to utilitarianism begins with some claims about 
value. happiness, you might think, is a good thing: it is good to be happy, and the 
world is better if it contains more happiness. And unhappiness, you might think, is 
a bad thing: it is bad to be unhappy, and the more unhappiness a world contains, the 
worse it is. You might think, furthermore, that where things apart from happiness 
and unhappiness are good or bad, their goodness and badness can be understood by 
reference to their contributions to happiness and unhappiness. happiness and un-
happiness, you might then conclude, are the only two things that have foundational 
value or disvalue, or that contribute in their own rights to making the world better 
and worse.
What will that tell you about rightness and wrongness? Well, you might accept 
the suggestion that people act rightly when they make the world better and wrongly 
when they make the world worse. if that is what you think, then you will go on to 
conclude that morally right acts are those that produce as much happiness and as 
little unhappiness as possible. And so you will have arrived at utilitarianism.
 that story is condensed and stylized. the important point, for my purposes, is 
that it identifies a route to utilitarianism from a commitment about impersonal value. 
there is no mention within the story of the fact that the good and bad things—hap-
piness and unhappiness—are always manifested in individuals. only subsequent to 
the story, once we start working out what we actually need to do in order to maximize 
the balance of happiness over unhappiness, does it become relevant that we can only 
change facts about happiness and unhappiness by making a difference to the levels 
of happiness enjoyed by particular individuals. As far as the story goes, it is not im-
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portant whether all the happiness and unhappiness is concentrated in a single indi-
vidual, or how happiness and unhappiness are distributed across various individuals, 
or how many individuals there are. the concern in the first instance is with happiness 
and unhappiness, not with the individuals in whom happiness and unhappiness are 
to be found.
 it is when we ground utilitarianism in this kind of story that we come most 
naturally to the thought that for utilitarianism, individuals are moral “buckets.” For 
moral purposes, runs the thought, individuals matter only because they are recep-
tacles in which happiness and unhappiness can be contained. Some expressions of 
the well-known objection that utilitarianism “does not take seriously the distinction 
between persons” are best understood as complaints about this utilitarian thought 
(Rawls 1972, p. 27). Utilitarianism misses something morally important, according to 
such complaints, because it addresses persons merely as contributors to impersonal 
value, not as separate individuals with their own lives to live.
 Following this first story about how to argue towards utilitarianism, the prin-
ciple of assistance will appear as a special case of a general injunction to distribute 
resources in ways that generate the most overall value. our moral reason to help the 
global poor, on the story, is that by helping the global poor we can make it the case 
that the world contains more of the foundational good and less of the foundational 
bad. this is “values-based” utilitarianism, similar to what others call “teleological” 
utilitarianism (Kymlicka 2002, pp. 32-37). it supports a “values-based” principle of as-
sistance. the reason revealed by the principle of assistance is a reason to respond 
properly to the value of happiness and the disvalue of unhappiness.
 now for the second story about how to argue towards utilitarianism. instead 
of beginning with some claims about value, suppose that you begin by thinking 
about the individuals for which you have moral concern. to the extent to which you 
are morally motivated, which individuals seem to you to matter? You might answer 
by saying that the morally considerable individuals are all those who are sentient, or 
who have subjective experiences, or who have a point of view, or who can be better 
or worse off, or who can be happy or unhappy—where it is plausible to think that an 
individual who has one of these features has all of them. humans and sentient non-
human animals matter morally, you might think, but trees and bricks do not.
thinking now about some particular morally considerable individual, ask what 
sort of treatment it merits. What is the right way to treat an individual that has its 
own point of view? there are many possible answers, but one of them is that the right 
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way to care about a morally considerable individual is to care about its happiness. 
Many individuals in the world merit moral concern, on this answer, and the right 
kind of moral concern, as addressed to any one of those individuals, is a desire that 
the individual enjoy happiness rather than suffering unhappiness.
 For each individual, you may then think, we have a moral reason to do things 
that contribute to its happiness and detract from its unhappiness. Such reasons, you 
might conclude, are the most fundamental moral reasons there are.
Such reasons, however, conflict. We cannot always make everyone happy. 
Sometimes, the act that will maximize one person’s happiness will set back the hap-
piness of another; sometimes, we have no choice but to discriminate between the 
demands made by different morally considerable individuals. So, we need a rule that 
tells us what to do when we cannot do the right thing by everyone. there are many 
rules we could conceivably adopt, but one of them is this: when you cannot make 
every individual happy, do whatever produces the most happiness and least unhap-
piness overall. it is unfortunate that we sometimes need to sacrifice the happiness of 
some individuals to secure the happiness of others, but when it must be done—you 
might think—the way to do it is to see which individuals have what quantities of 
happiness at stake, and then to choose options yielding greater quantities of overall 
happiness over those yielding smaller quantities.
And that is the second story, again condensed and stylized, about how to arrive 
at a utilitarian criterion of right action. What matters for present purposes is that the 
story gets to utilitarianism from a concern with individuals. Unlike the first story 
about how to get to utilitarianism, this second story does not explicitly call upon 
judgments about impersonal value. Unlike the first story, this second story passes 
through a point in the argument at which it would be possible, having identified the 
morally considerable individuals, to say that we should be concerned not with their 
happiness, but instead with—say—their preferences, moral flourishing, or levels of 
autonomy; and it passes through a point at which it would be possible to reject the 
maximization principle in favor of a principle that tells us—say—to spread happiness 
equally, or to maximize the level of happiness enjoyed by the person who has least, 
or to refuse to make comparisons between the happiness levels of individuals at all.
Compared with the first story about how to argue towards utilitarianism, it is 
more difficult to accuse this second story of failing to take seriously the distinction 
between persons. the command to maximize the balance of happiness over unhap-
piness, on this second story, is offered as a way of coping with the fact that different 
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persons have different and competing points of view. it is never imagined that indi-
viduals are not separate, or that they matter only for their contributions to an overall 
impersonal value. Utilitarianism arrived at through this line of thinking can be called 
“individuals-based” utilitarianism; it has affinities with what others have described as 
utilitarianism based on “equal consideration of interests” (Kymlicka 2002, pp. 32-37).
 like the first story, this second story about how to get to utilitarianism yields 
a version of the principle of assistance, but the line of thought that takes us there 
is different. the poor people of the world are morally considerable individuals, just 
like us, so we ought to make them happy rather than unhappy. to contribute to their 
happiness, we need to make sacrifices in our own levels of happiness, and that is un-
fortunate. but, looking at the plights of those individuals, it is clear that the stakes for 
them are far greater than are the stakes for us. So, if we have a proper moral concern 
for those individuals, then we will see that we ought to make the relatively small sac-
rifices in our levels of happiness required to secure relatively large increases in theirs. 
our reason to help the global poor is a reason to respond properly to the morally 
considerable individuals that make up the global poor. it is in this sense that we have 
arrived at an “individuals-based” principle of assistance.
tWo veRSionS oF the PRinCiPle oF ASSiStAnCe
 the two stories about how to get to utilitarianism illustrate the distinction 
between the values-based and the individuals-based principle of assistance, but the 
distinction does not rest on anything special about utilitarianism.
Speaking generally, the values-based principle of assistance says that our moral 
reason to help the global poor is a reason to respond properly to certain values. 
values-based utilitarianism, as i have imagined it, says that the values are happiness 
and unhappiness and the proper response is to maximize one and minimize the other, 
but other stories could be told. there can be other claims about which are the rel-
evant values, and there can be other claims about what counts as a proper response 
to them.
An example of a non-utilitarian values-based principle of assistance can be 
found in onora o’neill’s Kantian account of our obligations to the global poor 
(o’neill 2007, see especially pp. 558-560). o’neill endorses a version of the principle 
of assistance, saying that the fact that people are in poverty in itself provides us with 
an (imperfect) duty to do something to help them if we can. the consideration that 
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explains the existence of that duty is, for o’neill, the value of autonomy: the plight 
of the global poor is morally significant because poverty undermines the precondi-
tions of autonomy. the correct response to the value of autonomy, on o’neill’s view, 
is not to maximize it, but rather to live a life that honors it. For o’neill, to honor 
the value of autonomy is, among other things, to recognize that humans need the 
support of others to achieve full autonomy, and hence to do something, here and 
there, to alleviate conditions that make autonomy more difficult to achieve.
 on the individuals-based principle of assistance, our moral reason to help the 
global poor is a reason to respond properly to the various people who make up the 
global poor. the individuals-based version of utilitarianism, as i present it, says that 
the right response to those people is to try to increase their happiness, but, again, 
there are other stories to tell: other possible stories about what treatment people 
merit, and about how to make discriminations when not everyone can get the treat-
ment they would ideally receive.
 An example of a non-utilitarian individuals-based principle of assistance 
might be found in the view that our reasons to assist the global poor are generated 
by their natural positive rights. it might be held, for example, that every person has a 
right to have her basic needs met, if the resources required to meet those needs exist 
(Ashford 2007). the way to respond to any morally considerable individual, it might 
be held, is to respect her rights, and so for each person within the global poor we have 
a reason to do what we can to alleviate that person’s poverty.
 it is also possible to tell a Kantian story, different from o’neill’s, that gener-
ates an individuals-based principle of assistance. We could say that each person, as 
a rational being with the capacity for autonomy, demands in her own right whatever 
she needs in order to manifest genuine autonomy. that demand, we could say, then 
falls upon any person who could help make it the case that autonomy, for her, is 
achievable. As things are, many of the global poor face conditions that compromise 
their autonomy, and the global rich could alleviate those conditions at little sacrifice. 
So, we could conclude, our moral reason to help the global poor can be broken down 
into many different reasons to help: one for each of the rational individuals whose 
ability to live autonomously is compromised by her poverty.
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tWo veRSionS oF the PRinCiPle oF ContRibUtion
 there is a distinction between the values-based and the individuals-based 
principle of assistance. We can make the same distinction between different versions 
of the principle of contribution, though doing so is more difficult and perhaps less 
natural. here is how it could work.
 As a first possible route towards the principle of contribution, you could 
begin with a concern for particular individuals within the global poor whose poverty 
is partly caused by actions of the global rich. then you could make the judgment that 
each of those particular individuals is owed restitution for the harms she has suffered, 
and hence that the global rich should help the global poor. the basic moral relation-
ship behind the principle of contribution, so understood, is between the global rich, 
on one hand, and many members of the global poor considered separately, on the 
other. For each impoverished person whose poverty is partly caused by the actions of 
the global rich, there is a moral reason for the global rich to help that person. So this 
approach to the principle of contribution is individuals-based. our moral reason to 
help the global poor, on this approach, really comes down to our many moral rela-
tionships with the many members of the global poor whom we have harmed, and to 
the many reasons that emerge from those many relationships.
 As a second possibility, you could begin with the thought that the global 
rich, through their actions toward the global poor, have failed to respond properly to 
certain values. You might say, for example, that happiness is valuable and the global 
rich have, through their treatment of the global poor, spread unhappiness; or you 
might say that autonomy is valuable and the global rich have, through their treatment 
of the global poor, undermined autonomy. Where someone has failed to respond 
properly to a certain value, you might add, she can become obliged to make amends 
by doing what she can to restore the value where it was damaged. We might show 
proper respect for the value of happiness, for example, by trying to restore the happi-
ness of the people whom our past actions have made less happy; and we might show 
proper respect for the value of autonomy by helping those whose autonomy we have 
damaged in the past to enjoy greater autonomy in the future. You might go on to 
say that we have contributed to the unhappiness and undermined the autonomy of 
the global poor, and so we now have a special responsibility to help the global poor, 
as an expression of respect for the values of happiness and autonomy. if that is how 
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you explain our moral reasons to help the global poor, then you have a values-based 
version of the principle of contribution.
 i hope that the distinction between the values-based and individuals-based 
principles is now reasonably clear. it may become clearer as i explain the use to which 
i want to put it. First, though, i want to turn to a different topic: our knowledge of 
reasons, and how that knowledge is reflected in our motives.
KnoWledGe oF ReASonS
  it is possible to know that you have a reason to do something without knowing 
what that reason is. to put it another way, it is possible to know about the existence 
of a reason while lacking knowlege about its nature (Keller 2013, pp. 87-90).
 Suppose you get some medicine from the doctor, and she tells you that you 
must take it with food. if i ask you, “Should you take the medicine with food?” then 
you may answer, “oh yes: the doctor was very clear about that, and she’s always right. 
i should definitely take it with food.” if i then ask, “Why must you take the medi-
cine with food?” then you may answer, “i have no idea. the doctor didn’t tell me.” 
You know about one reason to take the medicine with food—the fact that the doctor 
told you to—but the question “Why must you take the medicine with food?” is, in 
this context, a request for a different kind of consideration: a medical consideration, 
the one that lies behind the doctor’s instruction. When it comes to that reason, it is 
natural to say that you know you have the reason, but you do not know what it is. You 
know that you should take the medicine with food, but you do not know why.
 here is a more involved example. imagine that you and i are at a crowded 
market. We are good friends, and you trust me to tell you the truth. We are separated, 
we both have cell phones, and we are avid texters—imagine. You receive a text from 
me, saying “Come and meet me at the top end of the market right away.” You reply, 
“oK. Why?” i reply, “Just come quickly! You have a very strong reason to come to the 
top of the market right away!”
 At this point, assuming that i am texting truly and sincerely and you are justi-
fied in trusting me, you know you have a strong reason to go to the top of the market 
as fast as you can: a reason, again, beyond the fact that you have just been told to go 
there by someone you trust. Yet, you do not know what the reason is. You do not 
even know what kind of reason it is. it could be a moral reason; perhaps someone is in 
danger and i need your help to save her. it could be a reason of self-interest; perhaps 
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someone is giving away gifts at the top of the market, or perhaps i have seen a trouble-
some ex-partner of yours at the market and i am trying to help you avoid him. or 
perhaps there is a beautiful sunset you will see from the top of the market, or perhaps 
someone you would like to meet is at the top of the market, or perhaps i am feeling 
panicky at the top of the market and need your immediate comfort. Any of these con-
siderations would count as a reason for you to come to the top of the market, but they 
are all different kinds of reasons, and you cannot discriminate between them. All you 
know is that you should hurry to the top of the market, for some reason or other.
FRoM KnoWledGe oF ReASonS to 
FUllY ShAPed MotiveS
 think about the motives you will feel as you hurry through the market after 
receiving my text. Knowing that you have a good reason to get to the top of the 
market, you might move as fast as you can. but you will not find any determinate 
sense of urgency in your motives, because you will not know why you are acting. You 
are likely to feel a little bemused, alienated, or detached. Your rushing to the top of 
the market will not quite make sense to you. You will have a motive, but your igno-
rance about the nature of your reason will be reflected in your motive. As i will put it, 
your motive will not be “fully shaped.”
 Suppose that as you walk towards the top of the market, i continue to send 
you text messages. i tell you, “it’s in your best interests to come to the top of the 
market straightaway!” then, “there’s a record for sale that you’ll want to buy before 
anyone else gets their hands on it.” then, “it’s by a seventies north American folk 
revival artist”; then, “it’s a Gordon lightfoot record”; then, “it’s Sundown”; then, 
“it’s an original mint condition US-issued lP”; then, “it’s only $20”; then, “it has a 
yellow price sticker”; and finally, “the price sticker is on the top left-hand corner.”
As you receive all this information, one piece at a time, you will gradually learn 
more about your reason to come to the top of the market as fast as you can. And as 
you learn more about your reason, your motive will become sharper. by the time you 
have received the last of my text messages, you will be fully engaged with your act of 
walking quickly towards the top of the market. You will fully understand what you 
are doing and why you are doing it. You will no longer be grasping for further infor-
mation, needed to make your actions make sense. Your motive for walking to the top 
of the market will be fully shaped.
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As a motive comes closer to being fully shaped, in the sense in which i am inter-
ested, it does not necessarily get stronger. As you learn more about why you should 
hurry to the top of the market, your motivation may in fact get weaker, as various 
more urgent possibilities are excluded. once you know that you will be buying a 
record, not helping me cope with a panic attack or saving a stranger from danger, you 
may judge that you have a weaker reason than you had suspected, and this may be 
reflected in your having a weaker motive.
 to have a fully shaped motive, rather, is to have a motive whose quality is not 
open to change with further information about your circumstances—meaning infor-
mation that fills out the details of your present situation, not information that reveals 
that the situation has changed. Your motive for hurrying to the top of the market is 
fully shaped once you have all the information you need in order to have a clear and 
complete sense of why your hurrying to the top of the market makes sense; it is fully 
shaped once further information becomes irrelevant. So, for example, it may be that 
you want to buy a copy of Sundown, and once you hear that a copy is for sale, that 
is enough for you to be fully motivated to go buy it. the record’s time and place of 
issue, its price, and the color of its price sticker may be matters of indifference to you, 
so that learning about them makes no difference to your motive to get to the stall and 
buy the record.
(Further information may yet make a difference to your motives not by chang-
ing the quality of this motive, but instead by adding another, different motive. if you 
learn that the person working at the record store is a good friend of yours, trying to 
make a start in the used music business, then you may come to be even more strongly 
motivated to come to the stall and buy the record, as a way of supporting him in his 
new venture—but now because you have two different reasons, and two correspond-
ing motives, not just one.)
 We can learn something about what you take to be your reason for perform-
ing a certain action by seeing how your motive for performing the action varies with 
new information. if you need a certain piece of information before you can have a 
fully shaped motive, then that piece of information would seem to play a role in your 
reason for acting, as you see it. if a certain piece of information would make no differ-
ence to the quality of your motive, then it would seem not to be relevant to the reason 
you take yourself to have. one way to see what you take as your reason to act is to ask 
what information you need in order for your motive to act to be fully shaped.
 Returning to the example: if you come to have a fully shaped motive once 
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you hear that the record being sold at the top of the market is Gordon lightfoot’s 
Sundown—if the information beyond that makes no difference to the quality of your 
motive—then that suggests that you take it as your reason to rush to the top of the 
market that by doing so you will get a copy of Sundown. if, instead, you have a fully 
shaped motive once you hear that someone is selling a record by a north American 
folk revival artist—if it makes no difference to your motive to hear more about which 
artist or album it is—then that would suggest that your reason for rushing to the top 
of the market, as far as you are concerned, is just that you have the chance to buy a 
record by some north American folk revival artist or other. Alternatively, your motive 
might be fully shaped only once you hear that the record available is an original mint 
condition US-issued edition of Sundown, available for $20; that would suggest that 
you take it as part of your reason that you can get this edition of the album at this 
cheap price. or, conceivably, you may have made a bet with someone that you could 
find a copy of Sundown with a yellow price sticker in its top left corner; in that case, 
perhaps, you will take it as an essential part of your reason to buy the record that it 
has a yellow price sticker in its top left corner, and so you will not have a fully shaped 
motive for buying it until the news about the sticker comes through.
KnoWledGe oF ReASonS to ASSiSt
back, now, to moral reasons to help the global poor. What do we know about 
the plight of the global poor and our ability to help? Most of us are aware that there 
are many impoverished people in the world. We are aware that many people suffer 
hunger, disease, and exploitation, and that many people lack freedom and autonomy 
and cannot fulfill their most basic needs. We also know that we are able to make those 
people better off. We know, for example, that if we donate some money to oxfam, 
then our money will be used to improve the lives of some people among the global 
poor.
 Most of us do not know anything much, however, about the particular people 
who make up the global poor. Most of us are acquainted with only a few members of 
the global poor at most. Regarding the vast majority of individuals among the global 
poor, we do not know who they are, or exactly what plights they suffer, or exactly 
what they most need for their lives to be improved. When we give money to oxfam 
we know it will be used to help some people, but we cannot name names. As a result, 
we are not equipped to feel any particularized concern for the individuals among the 
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global poor. We are not able to have thoughts about particular poor people; when we 
think about helping the global poor, we are not able to think about anyone whom we 
are helping.
 What do we then know about our reasons to help the global poor? the values-
based principle of assistance and the individuals-based principle of assistance give 
different answers.
on the values-based principle of assistance, we would appear to know every-
thing we need to know in order to have full knowledge of our moral reasons to help 
the global poor. We know that many people live in poverty, we know that the precon-
ditions of autonomy are not met, we know that basic needs are not being fulfilled, we 
know that there is unhappiness and exploitation—we know all about the values at 
stake. We know, for example, that suffering is bad and that a donation to oxfam will 
reduce suffering; if our reason to donate is a reason to reduce suffering, then in our 
present state of knowledge it is fully revealed.
 on the individuals-based principle of assistance, however, we would appear 
to be in one of those situations in which we know we have a moral reason to act but 
do not know what the reason is. We know we have moral reasons to help the global 
poor. We know that there are many individuals in the world who demand our assis-
tance, and whom we are able to assist. We know that for each of these individuals, we 
have a moral reason to help—but we do not know who those people are. We are not 
able to identify the individuals whose plights demand our assistance, so we are not 
able fully to identify our moral reasons to help them.
 in light of the considerations discussed earlier, it follows that the values-based 
and individuals-based principles yield different predictions about our motives to 
help the global poor. on the values-based version, we can have fully shaped motives 
for helping the global poor. on the individuals-based version, we cannot. in being 
moved to help the global poor, on the individuals-based principle, we will lack a de-
terminate sense of why our acts make sense. Particular individuals among the global 
poor are the sources of our moral reasons, but our motives do not have particular 
individuals on which to focus.
 As mentioned earlier, most of us, many of us think, do not do as much as we 
should to help the global poor. there are many explanations of why this should be. 
We are selfish; we are weak-willed; we have other priorities; we feel helpless in the 
face of the problem of global poverty; we are ignorant, often willfully; we are tempted 
by claims that any contribution we might make will only make things worse; and so 
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on (Singer 2009, ch. 4). there are also many explanations of why when we do help the 
global poor, we are more likely to be moved by particulars than by generalities. the 
general facts about global poverty are too big and complicated for us to comprehend; 
our emotions are engaged by personal stories, not by statistics; it is easier to forget 
a general fact than a personal story; personal stories reveal the suffering caused by 
global poverty in ways that general facts cannot; and so on. but the individuals-based 
principle of assistance, placed alongside some broad truths about how our knowledge 
of our reasons is reflected in our motives, offers a further explanation.
 if the individuals-based principle of assistance is correct, then we need to know 
about particulars, not just generalities, in order to know exactly what moral reasons 
we have to help the global poor, as opposed to knowing merely that the reasons exist. 
lacking such knowledge, it is unsurprising, in light of broader facts about motives 
and knowledge of reasons, that we should fail to do what we know we have reason 
to do. As we learn more about particular individuals among the global poor and the 
struggles they face, and as we imagine ourselves to be able to help particular identified 
impoverished people, it is predictable that we should feel more urgently gripped by 
our reasons to help and more likely to act on them.
 it is not surprising, if the individuals-based principle of assistance is correct, 
that when we are faced only by the general facts about global poverty, we feel list-
less and unmotivated. We can see that moral reasons to help are there, but we feel 
removed from them, because we do not know exactly what they are. but we come into 
closer contact with those reasons, or at least feel that we do, when we are presented 
with more details about the plights of the global poor and of our ability to help: when 
we know about a particular disaster and the challenges it raises, when we are offered 
the chance to sponsor a particular child or development project, and when we are 
presented with detailed and personalized stories. So under such circumstances, goes 
the explanation, we are more likely to do something to help.
 the explanation is not incompatible with other explanations of our habits of 
helping the global poor. it in fact fits nicely alongside them. Perhaps our emotions are 
more vividly engaged by particulars because we respond more vividly to our reasons 
the more we know about their nature. Perhaps we fall into weakness of will partly 
because our reasons to help the global poor are too distant to engage our motivations 
in the face of other temptations.
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in deFenSe oF the individUAlS-bASed 
PRinCiPle oF ASSiStAnCe: PARt 1
 in offering this explanation of our motives to help the global poor, as so far 
expressed, we do not need to suppose that the individuals-based principle of assis-
tance is correct. We need only suppose that most of us at some level take it to be 
correct. our motives are informed not directly by our knowledge of our true reasons, 
but instead by our knowledge of the considerations that we take to be our reasons. 
(even if you do not really have a reason to buy the copy of Sundown at the market, if 
you think you have such a reason, then that is enough to explain the quality of your 
motives as you receive the various pieces of information about its availability.) to put 
it another way, the explanation offered so far constitutes evidence that we take our 
moral reasons to help the global poor to be grounded in considerations of individu-
als, not of values—but still, we could be wrong.
  that said, there is a good case for thinking that sometimes, at least, if we can 
show that we usually take a certain consideration as a reason, then we have strong 
evidence that it is in fact a reason. First, there is a case for being conservative, in a 
certain respect, in drawing conclusions about our reasons to help the global poor. 
once we have accepted that we have moral reasons—of one kind of another—for 
helping the global poor, and once we have seen that we treat certain considerations, 
rather than others, as our reasons, and when we do not have any cause to think that 
in taking those considerations as reasons we are making a mistake: well, at that point 
in the argument, it is most reasonable to be conservative, and to presume that the 
reasons we take ourselves to have are the reasons we really have.
 Second, there are times at which we seem, in having certain motives, to be 
getting things right. to have a moral motive, sometimes, is to treat a given consider-
ation as morally powerful. When you see a child who has fallen off her bike, and you 
find yourself motivated to go and help her, you do not experience your motive merely 
as an urge, but also as a perception of what would be an appropriate response to the 
situation. Where a moral motive appears to be correct, or appropriate, or called for, 
it has some authority. if it can be shown that to have that motive is to take a certain 
consideration as a reason, then we respect the authority of the motive by accepting, 
in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it is not deluded: that the consid-
eration treated as a reason really is a reason (Keller 2013, pp. 25-27, 84-87).
 Coming to have a motive to help a member of the global poor upon learning 
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about the details of her circumstances or to help a group of people upon learning that 
they are affected by a disaster is plausibly an experience that carries moral authority, 
in the relevant respect. it is not an experience of being emotionally manipulated or of 
coming to have a brute or alien urge. it is rather an experience of seeing more clearly 
why you should do more to help this person, or to help the people affected by this 
disaster. the motives generated appear to be appropriate and to count as proper re-
sponses to the situations. the motives carry authority, and so by learning more about 
the reasons that you posit in having those motives, we can learn more about what 
reasons are really there.
 it seems to me, then, that the story told by the individuals-based principle of 
assistance—the story on which our motives to help the global poor are explained as 
responses to varying levels of knowledge about reasons grounded in considerations 
of individuals—should be accepted as a story about what reasons there are to help 
the global poor, not just about what reasons we think there are. the individuals-
based principle of assistance then has a virtue that the values-based principle of as-
sistance lacks. it is when we learn more about individuals, not when we learn more 
about values, that we learn more about our reasons for helping the global poor.
 the explanation offered by the individuals-based principle of assistance is not 
a straightforwardly empirical explanation. it seeks to explain observed empirical phe-
nomena, but it does so by employing a substantive normative claim (about the nature 
of reasons) plus a moral psychological claim (about the impact of our knowledge of 
reasons upon our motives). that said, the explanation is also not a moral explanation, 
if by that is meant a justification or excuse. When you know that you have a strong 
moral reason to perform a certain act, you should perform that act, even if you do not 
know what the reason is. When you know that there are many impoverished people 
who morally demand your assistance, you should render assistance, even if you do 
not know who those people are. the explanation does not show that we act rightly 
when we fail to act upon our reasons to assist the global poor. instead, it places that 
failure within a broader, independently understandable phenomenon—one that has 
nothing specifically to do with global poverty, or indeed with morality.
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in deFenSe oF the individUAlS-bASed 
PRinCiPle oF ASSiStAnCe: PARt 2
 if what i have said so far is correct, then the individuals-based principle of 
assistance tells an appealing story about our knowledge of our reasons to help the 
global poor and how that knowledge is reflected in our motives. the individuals-
based principle of assistance is able to tell that story because it grounds our reasons 
to help the global poor in considerations of individuals, not of values. the principle 
of contribution, as mentioned earlier, is most naturally expressed as an individuals-
based principle. on the individuals-based principle of contribution, our reasons to 
help the global poor are grounded in considerations of particular impoverished indi-
viduals to whose poverty the global rich have contributed. it may appear, then, that 
the individuals-based principle of contribution can offer a story just as attractive as 
the story told on the individuals-based principle of assistance.
 For the individuals-based principle of contribution, the story would go like 
this. We can know that we have reasons to help the global poor just by knowing that 
many people are greatly impoverished and that we, the global rich, contribute to their 
poverty. Knowing that we have such reasons, however, is not the same as knowing 
what those reasons are. to have full knowledge of any of our reasons we need to 
know about the circumstances of particular individuals among the global poor, and 
we need to see how the poverty of those individuals, in particular, results from the 
acts of the global rich. learning more about particulars of global poverty, and espe-
cially about our contribution to it, can then, on the principle of contribution, take us 
closer to full knowledge of our reasons to help the global poor. And that in turn can 
explain why learning more about particulars leads to our motives being more fully 
engaged, and why we are ultimately more likely to be moved by particulars than by 
generalities. the individuals-based principle of contribution, if this story succeeds, 
can do just as well as the individual-based principle of assistance.
 the story told on the individuals-based principle of contribution is different 
in a small but significant respect from the story told on the individuals-based prin-
ciple of assistance. on the individuals-based principle of assistance, you can know 
all about your reason to help a member of the global poor just by knowing about her 
poverty and your ability to help her. on the individuals-based principle of contribu-
tion, you also need to know that her poverty is partly due to the acts of the global rich. 
it is of course possible to learn that a person has suffered at the hands of the global 
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rich, and possession of that information can add to the sense that something really 
must be done to help that person. that a person’s poverty is caused by the acts of 
rich people can make her poverty all the more morally outrageous. learning that the 
global rich have contributed to a person’s poverty, however, is different from learning 
that you have contributed to her poverty—even if you are a member of the global rich.
  You may find that a particular person’s poverty results from the acts of the 
global rich. it is usually not possible, however, to find that her poverty results from 
any acts performed by you. You might find that the person’s poverty is caused partly 
by the acts of certain rich governments and corporations and by global political forces 
that lead back to the global rich, but that is not to say that anything you have done 
has made any difference at all to her circumstances. that is not how these large global 
causal processes work. the global rich caused her poverty, and you are a member of 
the global rich, but it does not follow that you caused her poverty. Anything you have 
done, probably, is irrelevant.
 As a result, there is a considerable distance between finding, following the 
principle of contribution, that the global rich ought to do something for an indi-
vidual and finding that you ought to do something for that individual. You are one 
member of the global rich, but you cannot discharge an obligation on behalf of the 
entire global rich: not when the obligation is accrued in response to large-scale collec-
tive actions and forces. And it is possible for the global rich to discharge its obligation 
without you doing anything at all. learning that someone’s poverty is due to actions 
of the global rich might lead you to believe that the global rich have an obligation to 
provide restitution, but that is not to believe that her poverty is due to your actions 
or that you have any resultant obligation.
 A similar relationship holds in the opposite direction. As a member of the 
global rich, you may be able to identify actions of yours that harm the global poor. 
Your habits of consumption, your use of energy, your support of various policies, 
governments, and corporations—all of these may count as acts that help reinforce 
global poverty. but to say that you harm the global poor is not to say that you harm 
any particular identifiable member of the global poor, and, probably, it is not possible 
even in principle to find any particular person who is worse off because of what you 
in particular have done. that, again, is not how the contribution of the global rich to 
the poverty of the global poor works.
 none of this is to show that the principle of contribution is mistaken, or that 
we do not accrue obligations as a result of our individual contributions to acts that 
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harm the global poor. the point is just that the story told on the principle of contri-
bution cannot generate a direct moral relationship between a particular individual 
among the global poor and a particular individual among the global rich. learning 
more about the circumstances of particular members of the global poor cannot pin-
point you as a person who has resultant reasons to help the global poor, arising from 
the contribution to global poverty made by the global rich. So when it comes to the 
phenomenon at issue—the power of knowledge of particulars in forming our patterns 
of motivation to help the global poor—the individuals-based principle of contribu-
tion cannot adopt the explanation offered on behalf of the individuals-based prin-
ciple of assistance. Considerations of our motives in responding to global poverty 
ground an argument for the individuals-based principle of assistance, but not for the 
individuals-based principle of contribution.
ConClUSion
 i have tried to articulate and make plausible a principle that explains why we, 
as members of the global rich, have reason to help the global poor. the principle is 
the individuals-based principle of assistance: it says that we should help the global 
poor because we can, and at little sacrifice, and it grounds this claim in considerations 
of the particular individual persons among the global poor who would benefit from 
our help. it depicts our moral reasons to help the global poor as reasons that fall upon 
each of us considered separately, and that take individual members of the global poor 
separately as their objects.
 My case for the principle is that it yields a plausible story about what we know 
about our reasons to help the global poor and about how our knowledge of our 
reasons is reflected in our motives. You are most likely to be moved to help a person 
in need when you are vividly aware of the person’s needs and of a course of action 
by which you could help ensure that those needs are met. on the story i tell, this fact 
about our motivations is not merely psychological, but emerges predictably from the 
structure of our reasons and our ability to have knowledge of our reasons. Placed 
alongside some general truths about how our motivations are engaged by knowledge 
about our reasons, the individuals-based principle of assistance can explain why our 
motivations to help the global poor are most pointed and powerful when we are con-
fronted with facts about particular people and particular circumstances.
the individuals-based principle of assistance can be distinguished from the 
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values-based principle of assistance and from the principle of contribution, and it is 
the only one of those principles, i have tried to show, that can tell the plausible story 
identified. it follows that the individuals-based principle of assistance gives the best 
explanation of the reasons held by individuals among the global rich to give help to 
the global poor. to that extent, there is good reason to accept the individuals-based 
principle of assistance as correct and indispensable.
it does not follow, however, that alternative principles are incorrect. there are 
other questions to be asked about reasons to help the global poor, apart from the ques-
tion of what we as individuals among the global rich should be doing. Among them 
are the questions of what reasons the governments of rich countries have to help the 
global poor, and what corporations and other rich institutions should do, and how 
the arrangement of global institutions should be changed in response to the plight of 
the global poor. these are questions about what should be done by collective agents 
and institutions. Regarding these questions, perhaps, the principle of contribution is 
more plausible, as it can focus upon the contribution to global poverty made by larger 
entities and forces, and upon the global poor considered as a class.
 let me emphasize in closing that the story i have told about our reasons to 
help the global poor is not intended to show that our reasons are not as strong as we 
might have thought, or that they only become powerful when we happen to be faced 
by knowledge of particulars. When we confront our obligations to the global poor, 
we find ourselves in an epistemic situation that involves a certain kind of motiva-
tional barrier. Most of us, most of the time, know that we have reasons to assist the 
global poor, but we do not know what those reasons are, exactly; and it is a general 
truth that mere knowledge of the existence of a reason is not as motivationally grip-
ping as is knowledge of the nature of that reason. that barrier appears to be a real and 
consequential barrier—by positing the existence of the barrier, we can explain some-
thing about how and when people come to be motivated to do things that help the 
global poor—and in recognizing it, perhaps we can come better to see why it should 
and could be overcome.
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